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Abstract Communication networks are becoming ubiquitous and more and more com-
petitive among revenue-maximizing providers, operating on potentially different tech-
nologies. In this paper, we propose to analyze the competition of providers playing with
access prices and fighting for customers. Considering a slotted-time model, the part of
demand exceeding capacity is lost and has to be resent. We consider an access price
for submitted packets, thus inducing a congestion pricing through losses. Customers
therefore choose the provider with the cheapest average price per correctly transmitted
unit of traffic.
The model is a two-level game, the lower level for the distribution of customers
among providers, and the upper level for the competition on prices among providers,
taking into account what the subsequent repartition at the lower level will be. We prove
that the upper level has a unique Nash equilibrium, for which the user repartition
among different available providers is also unique, and efficient in the sense of social
welfare. Moreover, even when adding a higher level game on capacity disclosure with a
possibility of lying for providers, providers are better off being truthful, and the unique
Nash equilibrium is thus unchanged.
Keywords Competition · Game theory · Wireless Networks · Pricing · Resource
allocation
Mathematics Subject Classification (2000) 90B10 · 91A80
P. Maille´
Institut Telecom/Telecom Bretagne, 2 rue de la Chaˆtaigneraie CS17607, 35576 Cesson-Se´vigne´
Cedex, FRANCE.
Tel.: +33-299127028
Fax: +33-299127030
E-mail: patrick.maille@telecom-bretagne.eu
B. Tuffin
INRIA Rennes Bretagne Atlantique, Campus Universitaire de Beaulieu, 35042 Rennes Cedex,
FRANCE.
Tel.: +33-299847494
Fax: +33-299847171
E-mail: bruno.tuffin@inria.fr
21 Introduction
Telecommunication networks are now managed by commercial service providers trying
to attract customers in order to maximize their revenue. A typical example is the In-
ternet: The network was indeed initially just a connection of academic and cooperative
sites, but it has now moved to a much broader entity, whose access for customers is
enabled by selfish and competitive providers. Furthermore, instead of having a network
per application, all applications (telephony, email, web browsing, video, games...) can
now be carried out using any technology, being the ADSL network, FTTx, 3G wireless
networks, WiFi or WiMAX (or LTE), with heterogeneous quality of service (QoS) ca-
pabilities. This convergence leads to a complex system which requires to be analyzed
from an economical point of view, taking into account the technological specificities.
1.1 Contribution
We propose in this paper to study a competition game among providers with hetero-
geneous and non-overlapping capacities (or spectrum if dealing with wireless). Those
providers are modeled by loss networks, such that if demand at a provider exceeds ca-
pacity, demand in excess is lost and has to be resent. Congestion pricing is applied by
charging for sent traffic instead of successfully received one. More precisely, the more
traffic is observed, the more likely packets are to be lost and then resubmitted (and
paid again for). As a result, the total price charged per successfully received packet,
named here perceived price, is an increasing function of demand. Customers are as-
sumed infinitesimal, i.e., the strategy of a single individual does not have any impact
on others: only a grouped action of a bunch of customers can affect congestion levels,
and thus perceived prices. Therefore, when they act selfishly, their global repartition
will obey the so-called Wardrop’s principle [22], initially introduced in the (equivalent)
transportation domain: only providers with the cheapest perceived price obtain some
demand. We show that whatever the access price at providers, there exists such a user
equilibrium situation, and that the (common) perceived price at all providers with
positive demand is unique. Knowing how customers will distribute themselves for any
combination of prices, providers try to maximize their revenue by playing with their
prices. We therefore end up with a two-level Stackelberg game [10], where the providers
are the leaders, using by backward induction the anticipated decision (the repartition)
of customers to determine their strategy. We show that there exists a unique Nash
equilibrium for the pricing game, and we characterize it explicitly. A Nash equilibrium
is a price profile such that no provider can unilaterally improve its revenue. We show
that this non-cooperative case actually and surprisingly leads to the same configuration
than the cooperative case, when all actors, i.e., providers and customers, jointly try to
maximize the sum of their utilities -also known as social welfare-.
This paper is related to [16], where the same pricing tools were applied, but users
were assumed to be sensitive to their total submitted traffic, not for received one. As a
consequence, lost packets were somewhat considered as satisfactory because they were
not resubmitted. We consider here the more realistic situation where traffic that counts
is the successfully transmitted one. Even if the results look similar to those in [16],
that new model requires a reformulation of the problem and a complete rewriting of
all proofs.
31.2 Related work
The general framework of the paper is that of non-cooperative game theory [10]. In
telecommunications, game theory has been used a lot in the last decade to model the
behavior of distributed algorithms, with potentially selfish actors (see for example [4]
and references therein).
We deal here more specifically with telecommunications pricing, a topic of active
research [6,7,18–20]. Remark however that most of the studies are dealing with a
monopoly, whereas we consider here an oligopoly. Oligopolies have been extensively
studied in other areas than telecommunications [21], but telecommunication networks
have specificities (e.g., congestion effects on QoS) that are not encompassed by most
models. Moreover, competition is a reality in the current telecommunication world, and
needs to be taken into account, since it can lead to significantly different results than
monopoly situations [11]. For other competition models, with different assumptions
and atomic users, the reader can look at, among others, [8,9,13–15,17].
The case of users’ distribution following Wardrop’s principle has been considered
in [5], where price competition among producers is studied without congestion effects
on the user side, but with a negative externality on the supply side through some
production costs. Our model also has some demand-related costs (that we interpret as
management costs), but we consider that their level is low with respect to revenues,
as can be expected in wireless networks where most costs come from infrastructure
and are independent of demand. We moreover introduce a particular form of negative
externality on the user level, that is typical for limited capacity networks with losses.
Other references [2,3,12] apply Wardrop’s principle on the user level to study compe-
tition. In all those papers the externality is the expected delay, not the loss probability
like here.
As described in the previous subsection, the present paper is related to one of our
previous works [16], but we now include the fact that retransmissions are taken into
account in the demand level. It is actually a more relevant and key new assumption,
that leads to completely different proofs.
1.3 Organization of the paper
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the general model. Section 3
defines the socially-optimal situation, i.e., the cooperative situation with providers and
customers jointly maximizing social welfare. In Section 4, we describe and characterize
how customers distribute themselves, following Wardrop’s principle, for any fixed pro-
file of provider prices. Using that user equilibrium, Section 5 shows that there exists
a unique equilibrium for the price competition among providers, and that the corre-
sponding outcome is actually socially optimal. Section 6 studies the potentiel interest
for providers to lie about their real capacities in a competitive environment and then
to artificially increase congestion for a potential larger revenue due to resent pack-
ets. Finally, Section 7 summarizes the contributions and presents directions for future
research.
42 General model
We consider a set I := {1, . . . , I} of I ≥ 2 providers in competition at an access
point. Time is slotted and each provider i (i ∈ I) can serve Ci > 0 packets (or
units, seen as a continuous number) per slot. If demand exceeds capacity at a given
provider, demand in excess is lost. Lost packets are assumed to be chosen uniformly
over the set of submitted ones. If di is the total demand at provider i, the number of
served packets is actually min(di, Ci), meaning that packets are actually served with
probability min(Ci/di, 1). Users are assumed to be charged a price pi for each submitted
packet instead of each served one. This induces a congestion pricing to yield incentives
to limit demand, the negative externality of congestion being expressed in terms of
losses experienced by users. The total income of provider i is dipi and the total service
“rate” is di min(Ci/di, 1). Then the average perceived price per served traffic unit at
provider i is therefore
p
i
= pi/min(Ci/di, 1) = pi max(di/Ci, 1).
Charging on sent packets instead of successfully transmitted ones may seem unre-
alistic. However, that mechanism can be seen as a volume-based pricing scheme, with
a congestion-dependent charge. Somewhat equivalently, it can also be seen as a con-
sequence of the more frequently used time-based charging with a fixed price per time
unit. Indeed, when congestion occurs on a network i and packets are lost, having to
send them again multiplies the total transfer time (and thus the price paid) by the
mean number of transmissions per packet max(1, di/Ci).
We assume that total user demand is a function D(·) of the perceived price p,
and that D is continuous, derivable, and strictly decreasing with p on its support
[0, pmax) (with possibly pmax = +∞), and that limp→+∞D(p) = 0. We moreover
assume that D(0) >
∑
i∈I Ci, i.e., that there is some congestion: the total resource
available is not sufficient to satisfy the maximum demand level. Finally, we assume that
D(0) < +∞: if the access were free, then the total demand would be finite. Remark
that this last assumption can be easily met, by considering the sending capacity limits
of user machines.
We also define the function v : q 7→ inf{p : D(p) ≤ q} (with the convention
inf ∅ = 0), that we call the marginal valuation function at the q-th unit of demand.
From our assumptions on D, v(q) is finite for all q ≥ 0. From an economic point of
view, v(q) represents the maximum price per traffic unit at which the q traffic units
could be sold.
We finally define V (q), the overall valuation, as the sum of the marginal valuations
of the q units of users with largest willingness-to-pay, i.e.,
V (q) :=
∫ q
x=0
v(x)dx.
The economic interpretation of V (q) is the total value of the first q served units of
traffic, for users who are willing to pay the most for the service. Those marginal and
overall valuation functions will be useful to characterize the socially-optimal situation
and the distribution d := (d1, . . . , dI) of customers among providers, obtained from a
given price profile.
The goal of each provider i is, by playing on its unit price pi, to maximize its net
benefit
Ri(p1, . . . pI) := pidi − `i(di),
5where pidi is the money earned directly from demand, and `i(di) represents the cost for
provider i of managing a demand level di. We assume that for all i, `i is nondecreasing.
Most of our results are valid under the following assumption preventing provider
management cost functions from being too steep. Remark that this assumption seems
reasonable, since management costs are in general very small with respect to infras-
tructure costs (that are independent on current demand, and thus not considered here),
and with respect to incomes from customers.
Assumption A The management cost function `i of every provider i ∈ I is Lipschitz-
continuous on [0, Ci] with a Lipschitz constant κi smaller than the global marginal
valuation of the sum of all provider capacities. In other terms,
∀i ∈ I, ∀x, y ≤ Ci, |`i(x)− `i(y)| ≤ κi|x− y|,
with κi ≤ v
(∑
j∈I Cj
)
.
Remark 1 Remark that Assumption A is satisfied for example if the functions (`i)i∈I
are derivable and convex, and such that
∀i ∈ I, `′i(Ci) ≤ p∗,
where `′i is the derivative of `i, and p
∗ = v
(∑
j∈I Cj
)
.
For some results, we will need a stricter assumption, that includes an elasticity
condition on demand:
Assumption B In addition to Assumption A, we assume that for unit prices larger
than p∗ := v
(∑
j∈I Cj
)
, the demand function D is sufficiently elastic:
y ≥ p∗ ⇒ −yD
′(y)
D(y)
≥ 1
1− κ/y , (1)
where κi is the Lipschitz constant for the cost `i on [0, Ci], κ := maxi∈I κi, and D′ is
the derivative of the demand function D.
Remark 2 When management costs are negligible (i.e., κi = 0 for all i ∈ I), then
Assumption B consists in demand elasticity being larger than 1, an assumption often
made in economics to describe situations where demand is highly sensitive to prices.
3 Socially optimal situation
Following usual vocabulary from economics, we define Social welfare as the sum of
utilities of all actors in the game -here, users and providers-. The total user utility is
the overall user valuation minus the total price paid, while the total provider utility
(revenue) is the total price paid minus the total managing cost. Therefore, prices do
not directly appear in the expression of social welfare.
Proposition 1 For a demand configuration d := (d1, ..., dI), social welfare is ex-
pressed by the quantity
SW(d) :=
∑
i∈I min(di, Ci)∑
i∈I di
V
(∑
i∈I
di
)
−
∑
i∈I
`i(di). (2)
6Proof The first term in SW is the total valuation for the service experienced by users.
Indeed, V (x) is the total user valuation, if the x users with largest willingness-to-pay are
served. For a given demand configuration, the total quantity served is
∑
i∈I min(di, Ci).
Moreover, when demand exceeds capacity, then not all demand is served: among total
demand
∑
i∈I di, only
∑
i∈I min(di, Ci) are served, the others getting no service and
thus having a zero valuation. Since we assume that losses occur regardlessly of user
willingness-to-pay, the actual (per traffic unit) utility of a user having (per traffic unit)
willingness-to-pay v is its willingness-to-pay times the probability to be served, i.e.,∑
i∈I min(di, Ci)∑
i∈I di
v.
User are assumed infinitesimal, therefore the total user valuation equals∫ ∑
i∈I di
u=0
∑
i∈I min(di, Ci)∑
i∈I di
v(u)du,
the first term in (2). The second term in (2) is simply the total managing cost for the
demand d.
In our next result, we characterize the most efficient demand vector d, in the sense
of social welfare. A priori, that demand configuration may not correspond to users
selfishly selecting their provider.
Proposition 2 Under Assumption A, social welfare is maximized when di = Ci for
each provider i.
Proof We consider any demand vector d, and we prove that truncating the demand di
to the capacity of each provider i ∈ I can only increase social welfare. Defining a new
demand vector dn = (min(di, Ci))i∈I , we have
SW(dn) = V
(∑
i∈I
min(di, Ci)
)
−
∑
i∈I
`i(min(di, Ci))
≥
∑
i∈I min(di, Ci)∑
i∈I di
V
(∑
i∈I
di
)
−
∑
i∈I
`i(min(di, Ci))
≥ SW(d),
where the second line comes from V being a concave function with V (0) = 0, which
implies that αV (x) ≤ V (αx) for any x ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. The third line simply comes
from the nondecreasingness of cost functions (`i)i∈I .
As a result, we can look for an optimal demand profile dopt in the compact convex
set C := ∏i∈I [0, Ci]. The objective function being continuous, such an optimal profile
always exists.
Now compare such an optimal demand dopt to the profile dC := (C1, ..., CI). Since
both profiles are in the set C, we have
7SW(dopt)− SW(dC)
=V
(∑
i∈I
di
)
− V
(∑
i∈I
Ci
)
+
∑
i∈I
(`i(Ci)− `i(di))
≤v
(∑
i∈I
Ci
)∑
i∈I
(di − Ci) +
∑
i∈I
(`i(Ci)− `i(di))
≤
∑
i∈I
(
v
(∑
i∈I
Ci
)
− κi
)
(di − Ci) ≤ 0.
where we used the concavity of V on the second line, and Assumption A on the last
line. This concludes the proof: the demand vector dC performs as least as well as any
other demand vector in terms of social welfare.
4 Wardrop equilibrium for users
Let us investigate the necessary and sufficient conditions for a demand vector d to
be a user equilibrium following Wardrop’s principle [22]. That principle states that
users always choose the cheapest options, so that for a stable situation, all users who
have the same set of available options end up paying the exact same price. It was first
introduced to model driver route choices in transportation, but can easily be applied
to our problem, yielding:
1. Providers getting some demand have the same perceived price, which is the cheapest
one. This can be written as
di > 0⇒ pi max(1, di/Ci) = min
j∈I
pj max(1, dj/Cj). (3)
Indeed, if a provider has a positive demand and a larger perceived price than a
competitor, then part of its customers would churn to the cheapest.
2. The total amount of data that users want to successfully transmit depends on the
perceived price per successful transmission. This writes∑
i∈I
min(di, Ci) = D(p), (4)
where
p := min
j∈I
pj max(1, dj/Cj),
i.e., the lowest perceived price among all providers. The left-hand side of (4) is the
total rate of successful transmission, that takes into account the capacity limitations
of each provider’s access network.
This allows to formally define the user equilibrium.
Definition 1 For given capacity C := (C1, . . . , CI) and price p = (p1, . . . , pI) config-
urations, a user equilibrium is a demand configuration d = (d1, . . . , dI) such that for
all i, j ∈ I,
8
di > 0⇒ pi max(1, di/Ci) ≤ pj max(1, dj/Cj),∑
k∈I
min(dk, Ck) = D
(
min
i∈I
pi max(1, di/Ci)
)
.
(5)
(6)
Condition (5) re-expresses (3), the fact that all providers with positive demand have
the same perceived unit price, otherwise part of the demand will have interest in
changing providers. Condition (6) is a formulation equivalent to (4). The assumption
that received data is the quantity of interest is by using rk = min(dk, Ck) in (5) instead
of dk if we were using the amount of sent data.
Remark that we can equivalently write a user equilibrium as a vector d such that
(d, p) is a solution of the system
(S)

(pi max(1, di/Ci)− p)di = 0, ∀i ∈ I
pi max(1, di/Ci)− p ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I∑
i∈I
min(di, Ci)−D(p) = 0,
di ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I
p ≥ 0.
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
In the system (S), p stands for the common value of the perceived price at all providers
that get demand.
The following proposition characterizes the user equilibria corresponding to fixed
capacities and prices.
Proposition 3 For any capacity and price configuration where prices are strictly pos-
itive, there exist a (possibly not unique) user equilibrium demand configuration. More-
over, at a user equilibrium d, the common perceived unit price p of providers i with
di > 0 is unique and equals
p = min{p : D(p) ≤
∑
i∈I
fi(p)}, (12)
where fi(p) := Ci1l{p≥pi}, (13)
with 1lX the indicator function, of value 1 if condition X is verified, and 0 otherwise.
Remark that we have a min in (12), since D is continuously nonincreasing and fi is
right-continuous and nondecreasing for all i ∈ I.
Proof We follow the same steps as those taken in [1] to establish the existence of a
solution for the system (S). But the results of [1] do not directly apply, due to the
distinction between demand flow d and successful flow r, thus we adapt the proof. We
first show that (S) is equivalent to the nonlinear complementarity problem described
9by the system
(S′)

(pi max(1, di/Ci)− p)di = 0 ∀i ∈ I,
pi max(1, di/Ci)− p ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I,(∑
i∈I
min(di, Ci)−D(p)
)
p = 0,
∑
i∈I
min(di, Ci)−D(p) ≥ 0,
di ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I,
p ≥ 0.
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
A solution of (S) is obviously a solution of (S′). Now consider a solution (d, p) of S′: if
it is not a solution of (S), then we necessarily have p = 0 and
∑
i∈I min(di, Ci) > D(p).
This last inequality means that there exists i ∈ I with di > 0, which implies from (14)
that p = pi max(1, di/Ci) > 0, a contradiction.
Therefore the set of Wardrop equilibria corresponds to the set of solutions of (S′),
which we now show is non-empty. First define a constant K1 < +∞ satisfying{
K1 > maxi∈I
Civ(Ci)
pi
K1 > maxi∈I Ci,
which exists under our assumptions on D, and a constant K2 < +∞ such that
K2 > max
i∈I
{K1pi/Ci}. (20)
Remark that we then have
∀i ∈ I, D(piK1/Ci) < Ci. (21)
We define the function Φ : R|I|+1 → R|I|+1 by
Φ(d, p) = (Φ1(d, p), . . . , Φ|I|+1(d, p))
with Φi(d, p) =
min(K1,[di − pi max(1, di/Ci) + p]+) if i ≤ |I|,
min(K2,[p+D(p)−
∑
j∈I
min(dj , Cj)]
+) for i= |I|+1,
(22)
(23)
where [x]+ stands for the positive part of x.
Since Φ is a continuous function that maps the cube [0,K1]
|I| × [0,K2] onto itself,
from Brouwer’s fixed point theorem it admits a fixed point (dˆ, pˆ). We now prove that
this point is a solution of (S′), i.e., it is a Wardrop equilibrium.
– Assume that dˆi = K1 for some i ∈ I, then from (22) we have p ≥ pi max(1,K1/Ci) >
0. Thus (21) implies that D(pˆ) < Ci = min(dˆi, Ci) ≤
∑
j∈I min(dˆj , Cj). Conse-
quently, from (23) and (dˆ, pˆ) being a fixed point of Φ, we have pˆ = 0, which is a
contradiction.
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– Likewise, if pˆ = K2 then from (20),
pˆ > piK1/Ci ≥ pi max(1, dˆi/Ci) ∀i ∈ I,
where the second inequality comes from K1 > Ci and dˆi ≤ K1. This implies
from (22) that dˆi = K1,∀i ∈ I, which cannot happen as proved just before.
As a result, (dˆ, pˆ) is a solution of the system{
dˆi = [dˆi − pi max(1, dˆi/Ci) + pˆ]+ ∀i ∈ I
pˆ = [pˆ+D(pˆ)−∑i∈I min(dˆi, Ci)]+,
which is exactly equivalent to the system (S′). Thus we have proved the existence of a
Wardrop equilibrium.
Now we consider a Wardrop equilibrium, and characterize the minimum perceived
price p. From Condition (8),
pi < p⇒ di > Ci, (24)
while from (7) we get
pi > p⇒ di = 0,
pi = p⇒ di ≤ Ci. (25)
Using Inequality (24), then (9) and finally (25), we get∑
i∈I
1l{pi<p}Ci ≤ D(p) =
∑
i∈I
min(di, Ci) ≤
∑
i∈I
1l{pi≤p}Ci,
which gives (12).
Unit price
Quantities
D(p)
C1
p1
C2
p2
C3
p3
C4
p4p
Fig. 1 Wardrop equilibrium for four providers and a given price configuration: the common
perceived price at each provider with positive demand (i.e., providers 1, 2, 3) is p. Here the
intersection occurs on an horizontal part of the stairstep curve.
Remark 3 Figures 1 and 2 display the two possible configurations for determining the
Wardrop equilibrium perceived price p. Either the stairstep curve summing up the
capacities at the charged prices crosses the demand function on a horizontal part, or it
happens on a vertical part. In any case, the existence and uniqueness of p are ensured
(because one curve is increasing while the other is strictly decreasing), as shown in
Proposition 3.
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Unit price
Quantities
D(p)
C1
C2 +C3
C4
p1 p4p = p2 = p3
Fig. 2 Wardrop equilibrium for four providers and a given price configuration: the common
perceived price at each provider with positive demand (i.e., providers 1, 2, 3) is p. Here the
intersection occurs on a vertical part of the stairstep curve.
Remark 4 Total demand served is therefore D(p). For all providers with price pi 6= p,
demand di is then di = 1l{pi<p¯}Cip/pi. All providers such that pi = p (if any) share the
remaining demand D(p)−∑j:pj<p dj , all possible sharing with 0 ≤ di ≤ Ci providing
a Wardrop equilibrium. That situation is illustrated in Figure 2. In that sense, there
is not always uniqueness for the Wardrop equilibrium, and the corresponding revenues
for each provider are not necessarily unique. Note nonetheless that the resulting total
revenue is always the same. Moreover, we will see in the following that when providers
are at a Nash equilibrium of the pricing game, then the corresponding user Wardrop
equilibrium is unique.
5 Price competition among providers
In this paper, we consider that providers setting their prices is the upper stage of a
two-level game, where the lower stage corresponds to users reacting according to the
Wardrop equilibrium described in Definition 1. We assume that providers are aware
of their advantage of playing first, i.e., they anticipate and take into account users’
reaction when determining their price. That common knowledge complicates the com-
petition among providers, and is the purpose of the analysis in this section.
Our main result is a complete characterization of the Nash equilibrium of the pricing
game, taking benefit from the above corresponding characterization of the Wardrop
equilibrium.
Proposition 4 Under Assumption B, there exists a Nash equilibrium of the price war
among providers, given by
∀i ∈ I,
{
pi = p
∗
di = Ci
,
where p∗ = v
(∑
j∈I Cj
)
, that is
∑
i∈I
Ci = D(p
∗). (26)
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Moreover, if cost functions (`i)i∈I are strictly increasing, then there is no other Nash
equilibrium.
In words, the proposition means that at equilibrium, all providers set the same
price, such that demand equals the total capacity of the system.
Proof The proof can be decomposed into two steps:
1. We first show that if cost functions are strictly increasing, only the point such that
di = Ci and pi = p
∗ ∀i, with p∗ = v (∑i∈I Ci) can be a Nash equilibrium;
2. then we prove that that point is indeed a Nash equilibrium. Remark that we do
not need the strict increasingness of cost functions for that part.
Step 1: Uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium.
Assume that there exists a price configuration p that is a Nash equilibrium of
the pricing game, and decompose the set of providers I into three disjoint subsets:
I = Is ∪ I0 ∪ Iu, where
Is := {i ∈ I : di > Ci}, (27)
I0 := {i ∈ I : di = Ci}, (28)
Iu := {i ∈ I : di < Ci}. (29)
We will show that Is and Iu are empty sets, which then implies from (7) and (9) that
the price configuration is p = (p∗, ..., p∗).
We first prove that Is = ∅. Assume it is not the case, and consider is ∈ Is. From (7),
we have pis < p and dis = Cisp/pis , leading to
Ris = Cisp− `is
(
Cis
p
pis
)
. (30)
Consider provider is unilaterally increasing its unit price pis to p
n
is , with pis < p
n
is < p.
Then from (12) we have
D(p) ≤
∑
i∈I
Ci1lp≥pi =
∑
i∈I
Ci1lp≥pni
and p < p⇒ D(p) >
∑
i∈I
Ci1lp≥pi ≥
∑
i∈I
Ci1lp≥pni ,
which implies (again from (12), but applied to the new price profile) that the perceived
price at the new Wardrop equilibrium is unchanged: pn = p. Therefore, since pnis < p
by hypothesis, Relation (30) is still valid with new prices, and the revenue change for
provider is is
Rnis −Ris = `is
(
Cis
p
pis
)
− `is
(
Cis
p
pnis
)
> 0,
due to the strict increasingness of `is . This contradicts the fact that p is a Nash
equilibrium and as a consequence,
at a Nash equilibrium, Is = ∅. (31)
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Assume now that Iu 6= ∅ at a Nash equilibrium price profile p. Since we nec-
essarily have Is = ∅, then from (9), D(p) =
∑
i∈I di <
∑
i∈I Ci = D(p
∗), with
p∗ = v
(∑
i∈I Ci
)
. This implies that
p > p∗. (32)
We first briefly rule out the possibility that D(p) = 0: if it were the case, all
providers i ∈ I would have profit −`i(0). But any provider i ∈ I unilaterally changing
his price to pni = v(Ci) would get a total demand Ci and obtain profit
Rni −Ri = Civ(Ci)− `i(Ci) + `i(0).
Since v(Ci) > v(
∑
i Ci) = p
∗, under Assumption A, we have Rni −Ri > Ci(p∗−κi) ≥ 0.
Thus Rni > Ri, a contradiction. Consequently, at a Nash equilibrium D(p) > 0.
Now, the assumption Iu 6= ∅ implies that there exists a provider iu such that
diu < min(Ciu , D(p)). (33)
Indeed, there exists at least a provider in Iu, and if that provider does not verify (33),
then he gets all the demand D(p), and therefore every other provider i has demand
di = 0 < min(Ci, D(p)) and verifies (33).
Recall that every provider i ∈ I has pi ≥ p, from (8) and Is being empty. We
now prove that provider iu can strictly improve its benefit by changing its price from
piu ≥ p to pεiu := p− ε for a sufficiently small ε > 0. We distinguish two cases.
– If Ciu ≤ D(p), then we easily see from (12) that the new perceived price pε verifies
pεiu = p− ε < pε ≤ p.
By changing its price to p − ε, provider iu is the only provider with the lowest
declared unit price, therefore from (7)-(8), its new demand dεiu equals Ciu
pε
p−ε ,
which tends to Ciu when ε tends to 0.
– If Ciu > D(p) then for ε sufficiently small (such that D(p− ε) ≤ Ciu), provider iu
gets all the demand, i.e., dεiu = D(p − ε). When ε tends to 0, that demand tends
to D(p) because of the continuity of the demand function.
Consequently, for a sufficiently small ε, the demand for provider iu of switching from
price piu to price p− ε can be arbitrarily close to y := min(Ciu , D(p)) > diu , and the
corresponding revenue gain can then be arbitrarily close to
p(y − diu)− `iu(y) + `iu(diu)≥ (p− κi) (y − diu)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
≥ (p− p∗)(y − diu)
> 0,
where the first and second line come from y ≤ Ciuand Assumption A, and the last
line stems from (32). Consequently, provider iu can strictly improve its net benefit
by unilaterally changing its declared price, which contradicts the Nash equilibrium
condition and establishes that we necessarily have
at a Nash equilibrium, Iu = ∅. (34)
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Relations (31) and (34) imply that at a Nash equilibrium, di = Ci for all i ∈ I.
Then the demand relation (9) implies that p = p∗, while (7) gives pi = p for all i ∈ I.
At a Nash equilibrium, each provider i necessarily declares unit price pi = p
∗.
Step 2: pi = p
∗, ∀i is a Nash equilibrium.
We now consider the price profile p such that pi = p
∗,∀i. For that price profile, we
have di = Ci for all i ∈ I, and p = p∗. First note that all providers i ∈ I get a revenue
larger than −`i(0):
Ri + `i(0) = p
∗Ci − (`i(Ci)− `i(0)) ≥ Ci(p∗ − κi) ≥ 0, (35)
where the inequalities come from Assumption A.
Let us now prove that no provider has an incentive to change his price if all the
others keep their price to p∗. Without loss of generality, consider a possible move of
provider 1 from p∗ to pn1 6= p∗. We distinguish two cases.
– If pn1 < p
∗, then
D(p∗) =
∑
i∈I
Ci =
∑
i∈I
Ci1l{p∗≥pni }
and p < p∗ ⇒ D(p) >
∑
i∈I
Ci ≥
∑
i∈I
Ci1l{p≥pni },
which from (12) means that pn = p∗. Therefore, (8) and (7) imply that dn1 =
C1p
∗/pn1 . The revenue difference for provider 1 is thus
Rn1 −R1 = `1(C1)− `1(C1 p
∗
pn1
) ≤ 0,
where the last inequality comes from the nonincreasingness of `1. Remark that
Rn1 < R1 if `1 is strictly increasing.
– If pn1 > p
∗, then
p ≤ p∗ ⇒ D(p) >
∑
i6=1
Ci ≥
∑
i∈I
Ci1lp≥pni .
Moreover, since all providers i ∈ I have a price pni = p∗ ≤ pn1 , then
D(pn1) ≤ D(p∗) =
∑
i∈I
1l{pn1≥pni }Ci.
As a result, from (12) the new perceived price pn is such that
p∗ < pn ≤ pn1 .
If pn < pn1 then d
n
1 = 0 from (7), and R
n
1 = −`1(0) ≤ R1 from (35).
If pn = pn1 then (8) implies that d
n
1 ≤ C1 and dni > Ci for all i 6= 1. Therefore(9)
implies that
dn1 = D(p
n
1)−
∑
i 6=1
Ci,
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and the revenue change for provider 1 is
Rn1 −R1=pn1dn1 − `1(dn1)− p∗C1 + `1(C1)
≤pn1
D(pn1)−∑
i 6=1
Ci
− p∗C1
+κ1(
∑
i∈I
Ci −D(pn1))
<pn1D(p
n
1)− p∗D(p∗) + κ1(D(p∗)−D(pn1))
=(pn1 − κ1)D(pn1)− (p∗ − κ1)D(p∗). (36)
where the second line comes from Assumption A, and the third one from pn1 > p
∗
and D(p∗) =
∑
i∈I Ci. Now consider the function
g(y) := (y − κ1)D(y)− (p∗ − κ1)D(p∗). (37)
We have g(p∗) = 0. Moreover, g is derivable on [p∗, pn1 ], and its derivative has the
same sign as
yD′(y)
D(y)
+ 1
1−κ1/y , which is nonpositive under Assumption B. Conse-
quently, g(pn1) ≤ g(p∗), and going back to (36) we have Rn1 < R1, concluding the
proof.
6 Can providers lie on their capacities?
In the previous sections, we assumed that the total capacities (Ci)i∈I were common
knowledge of all participants. While this may not be true in reality, we may consider
that providers be asked to declare their capacity level at the very beginning of the
interaction, i.e., before choosing their prices, or that the used capacities have been
learnt. A question that then naturally arises, since providers are still assumed to be
selfish, is related to the capacity declaration strategy: is there an interest to lie on
one’s capacity? In this section, we answer negatively to that question, by proving that
truthfulness is a dominant strategy for providers under Assumption B. As a result, even
if we add a third level -a game on declared capacities- on the considered interaction
-game on prices plus user choices-, there is still a unique equilibrium, that is socially
efficient.
To establish that result, we assume now that each provider i ∈ I has to declare
its capacity value Ci, and denote by C
dec
i the value that it chooses to declare. First,
remark that only the declared values Cdeci ≤ Ci are feasible: whereas provider i can
easily artificially degrade its service rate, it cannot increase it above its real capacity
Ci: a false declaration aimed at increasing one’s demand to get a larger benefit would
be detected.
We assume that the capacity declaration occurs before the providers set their price,
i.e., they commit to a certain service rate Cdeci . Then from Proposition 4, providers
know that price competition will lead to a unique Nash equilibrium where all providers
declare the same unit price
pNE = v
(∑
i
Cdeci
)
, (38)
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and each provider i gets demand Cdeci . Providers should therefore use that knowledge
when choosing the capacity level to declare.
Focusing on the net revenue of a provider, there are two opposite effects of declaring
a falsely low capacity Cdeci < Ci instead of the real capacity Ci:
– since the total available capacity decreases, from (38) the unit selling price at
equilibrium increases, and the managing cost decreases because the quantity sold
decreases;
– on the other hand, less quantity sold means less revenue.
The next proposition gives a sufficient condition for the latter effect to overcome the
former.
Proposition 5 Consider that providers can artificially lower their capacity. Under
Assumption B, truthfully declaring one’s real capacity is a dominant strategy for each
provider.
Moreover, all providers truthfully declaring their capacities is the only Nash equi-
librium of the capacity declaration game, and is a strict equilibrium.
First recall from Game Theory that a strict Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile
such that each player is strictly worse off by any unilateral deviation.
Proof Without loss of generality, we prove that provider 1 strictly decreases its revenue
by declaring a capacity CU1 < C1, when each competitor i ∈ I\{1} declares Cdeci ≤ Ci.
First remark that due to the nonincreasingness of v, Assumption B still holds with
declared capacities and the corresponding price p∗ = pNE. Therefore, the equilibrium
of the price competition game is unique and given by Proposition 4 with those declared
capacities. In other words, if we define Cdec−1 :=
∑
i 6=1 C
dec
i , the unit price p
NE at the
price competition equilibrium is then
pNE = v(Cdec1 + C
dec−1 ). (39)
Each provider i ∈ I gets demand Cdeci , and gets total benefit Ri = Cdeci pNE−`1(Cdec1 ).
Notice that pNE ≥ p∗.
Now let us compare any untruthful declaration Cdec1 = C
U
1 < C1, leading to
provider 1 revenue RU1 , to the truthful declaration C
dec
1 = C1, with provider 1 revenue
RT1 . We have
RU1 −RT1
=CU1 v(C
U
1 +C
dec−1 )− C1v(C1+Cdec−1 ) + `1(C1)− `1(CU1 )
=(D(pU)−Cdec−1 )pU+(D(pT)−Cdec−1 )pT+`1(C1)−`1(CU1 ),
where pU := v(CU1 +C
dec−1 ), and pT := v(C1 +Cdec−1 ). The second equality comes from
D(pU) = CU1 + C
dec−1 and D(pT) = C1 + Cdec−1 . Remark that pU > pT since D is
nonincreasing.
From Assumption A, we have
RU1 −RT1
≤(D(pU)− Cdec−1 )pU + (D(pT)− Cdec−1 )pT + κ1(C1 − CU1 )
=−(pU − pT)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
Cdec−1 + pUD(pU)− pTDpT + κ1 (C1 − CU1 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=D(pT)−D(pU)
,
≤(pU − κ1)D(pU)− (pT − κ1)D(pT). (40)
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The last line, taken as a function of pU, is of the same form as in (37), and is therefore
nonincreasing for pU ≥ pT under Assumption B. Since it is null at pT, then pU > pT
yields RU1 ≤ RT1 , which proves that truthful declaration is a dominant strategy. As a
result, all providers being truthful is a Nash equilibrium of the price declaration game.
Remark that as soon as one competitor declares a non-zero capacity, then Cdec−1 > 0,
and the inequality in (40) is strict. Therefore, the (truthful) Nash equilibrium is a strict
equilibrium, and the only possible other equilibrium would consist in all providers
declaring a null capacity, i.e., Cdeci = 0 for all i ∈ I. We now exclude that possibility.
Consider provider 1, and assume all its competitors declare a null capacity, i.e.,
Cdec−1 = 0. By declaring a null capacity Cdec1 = 0, provider 1 would get a total revenue
RU1 = −`1(0). However declaring its true capacity C1 and setting its price to v(C1)
would yield a revenue RT1 = C1v(C1)− `1(C1). Under Assumption A, the revenue gain
is therefore
RT1 −RU1 ≥ C1(v(C1)− κ1) > 0,
where the strict inequality comes from the strict decreasingness of v. As a result,
provider 1 has an interest to deviate from the situation where providers declare zero
capacity, which rules out that situation for being a Nash equilibrium, and concludes
the proof.
As a consequence of Proposition 5, even if providers have the possibility to ar-
tificially reduce their service capacity before fixing their prices, the final outcome of
the competition game still corresponds to the socially efficient situation pointed out in
Proposition 2.
7 Conclusion
This paper provides an analysis of a pricing game among competitive telecommuni-
cation service providers with potentially different but fixed capacities. According to
the price profile, we have been able to define and characterize the demand repartition
for selfish infinitesimal users, applying Wardrop’s principle. Using the knowledge of
what this repartition would be, providers can play with their price in order to max-
imize their revenue. We have proved the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium for
that game, where all providers set the same price, for which demand exactly meets
the sum of capacities. We have also established that providers have no incentive to
artificially create some congestion by declaring a falsely low capacity. It turns out that
those interactions among selfish agents (providers and customers) lead to an outcome
that maximizes social welfare, i.e., available network resources are optimally used.
As extensions of this work, we would like to investigate the viability of (or to define
rules to make viable) scenarii that might be more specific to wireless. For instance when
a provider is a virtual operator leasing capacity to a competitor owning a license. Other
scenarii of interest would regard cognitive networks, i.e., the case when unused capacity
can be used by secondary users. In general, considering a capacity expansion game is
also an interesting issue. Indeed, capacity can be an important parameter providers
can play with, at the same time as prices: what would the resulting equilibrium be?
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